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Tax Effort in Developing Countries and High Income
Countries: The Impact of Corruption,
Voice and Accountability
Richard M. Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Benno Torgler*
University of Toronto, Canada (email: rbird@rotman.utoronto.ca)
Georgia State University, Atlanta (email: jorgemartinez@gsu.edu)
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane (email: benno.torgler@qut.edu.au)
Abstract:

In this paper we argue that a more legitimate and responsive state is an essential factor
for a more adequate level of tax effort in developing countries and high income countries.
While at first glance giving such advice to poor countries seeking to increase their tax
ratios may not seem more helpful than telling them to find oil, it is presumably more
feasible for people to improve their governing institutions than to rearrange nature’s bounty.
Improving corruption, voice and accountability may not take longer nor be necessarily
more difficult than changing the opportunities for tax handles and economic structure.
The paper also shows that high income countries have also the potential of improving
their tax performance through improving their institutions. The key contribution of this
paper is to extend the conventional model of tax effort by showing that not only do supply
factors matter, but that demand factors such as corruption, voice and accountability also
determine tax effort to a significant extent.

I. INTRODUCTION
Many developing countries need to spend more on public infrastructure, education, health
services and so on, and hence they need to increase their tax effort – tax revenue as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP) – if they want to grow and to be less poor. The emphasis
in earlier analysis of the low tax effort observed in many developing countries was on the
‘supply side’ factors or ‘tax handles’, such as the ready availability of (easily taxed) economic
activities, for example, foreign trade and mining. These factors remain important in explaining
what countries do, but telling a country that wants to raise its tax levels to ﬁnd and tax natural
resources is not a particularly promising piece of policy advice.
*
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‘Will underdeveloped countries learn to tax?’ asked Nicholas Kaldor (1963), forty years
ago. Underlying this question is the assumption that if a country wishes to become ‘developed’
it needs to collect in taxes an amount greater than the 10-15 percent found in many developing
countries.1 Kaldor’s answer to his question was essentially that since even the poorest country
had sufficient ‘capacity’ in both economic and administrative terms to tax more, whether or not
a particular country did so depended primarily on its political institutions. Would developing
countries be fortunate enough to have those with political power voluntarily give up at least
some of their power to block fiscal reform in exchange for social stability? Or would the ruling
groups rather wait (in the spirit of après moi le deluge) for the revolutionary upheaval that he
considered the only alternative (Kaldor 1963)? Although some literature stresses the limits
administrative capacity imposes on taxation in developing countries (Bird 1989), those who
advocate more taxation as an essential ingredient of any lasting solution to underdevelopment
have seldom been deterred by such skepticism. In a sense they seem right in ignoring this
problem since the evidence appears to suggest that, if the political will to tax is there, the
administrative way to do so can be found, if not immediately then shortly.2 Indeed, as again
Kaldor (1963) explicitly noted, one of the principal lessons that has been learned from tax
reform experience around the world is precisely that ‘political will’ is the sine qua non of any
successful tax reform Bird (2004) and that a country’s tax system reflects its political institutions.
In the words of Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) it appears that ‘Institutions rule’ in
this as in other areas of economic development.
The main reason many developing countries do not do tax themselves more may be that
it is not in the interest of those who dominate the political institutions of such countries to
increase taxes. If this is the story, then traditional economists may have a problem in suggesting
a viable solution. Thus, it is interesting to explore whether the recent political economy
literature on the importance of voice and corruption provides more useful instruments in
this respect. It is also useful to test this hypothesis in high income countries. More and more
studies report the relevance of procedural fairness when examining tax systems in developed
countries (for an overview see Torgler 2007). Thus, we are going to ask whether institutions
can be modified to produce more ‘pro-fiscal’ outcomes (assuming for present purposes that
this is desirable).3

II. POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
What is actually done will of course be determined in the political arena. Countries vary
enormously in the effectiveness and nature of their political systems. The dominant policy
ideas in different countries – about equity and fairness, efficiency, and growth – like the
dominant economic and social interests – capital, labor, regional, ethnic, rich, poor – and
1

2
3
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Kaldor’s contemporary, Sir Arthur Lewis (Martin and Lewis 1956), a few years earlier had similarly argued
that ‘…the government of an under-developed country needs to be able to raise revenue of about 17 to 19
percent of G.N.P. ...in order to give a not better than average standard of service.’
For example, this is essentially the conclusion drawn in the review by Bird and Casanegra (1992).
We do not, however, attempt a formal ‘political economy’ analysis of the problem: see, for example, Cheibub
(1998) and Hettich and Winer (1999). The present paper significantly extends the empirical analysis in our
earlier, broader treatment of some of these issues in Bird et al. (2006).
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the key institutions – political (democracy, decentralization, budgetary) and economic (free
trade, protectionism, macroeconomic policy, market structure ) – all interact in the formulation
and implementation of tax policy. This changing interplay of ideas, interests, and institutions
over time affects the level of taxation, the structure of taxation, and both such critical details
as the progressivity of rates and the big outcomes such as the tax ratio with respect to GDP.
Indeed, taxation is probably one of the clearest arenas in which to witness the working out
of these complex forces.
The issue of low tax effort in developing countries has been particularly relevant in Latin
America. Over the last forty years, most Latin American countries found it difficult to achieve
a sustainable policy balance given the often conflicting and frequently changing forces,
external and internal, economic and political, they have faced. It is thus not surprising that
their tax policies have changed considerably over this period – though much less in either
level or structure than might have been expected. Indeed, it may be that countries tend to
achieve an equilibrium position with respect to the size and nature of their fiscal systems
that largely reflects the balance of political forces and institutions, and stay at this position
until ‘shocked’ to a new equilibrium.
In this respect, the data on taxation in Latin America, partial and in many ways unsatisfactory
as they are, suggest several interesting insights. First, over the last few decades taxes have
hardly increased at all in Latin America.4 Some rates have risen, mainly for VAT, but many
have declined, mainly for income taxes. The ‘tax effort’ (taxes as a share of GDP) of most
Latin American countries has changed little. Latin American countries continue to be below
average in terms of the size of their public sectors relative to their levels of per capita income
(IDB 1998). Second, countries that had relatively high taxes at the end of the 1970s were still
above the regional average in the 1990s, just as those that depended more on income than on
consumption taxes continued on the whole to do so. Third, although the reality of taxation in
Latin America has changed little, as evidenced by the relative constancy in both tax levels
and tax structures across and within countries, many changes have taken place in tax policy
across this complex region over the last few decades. Economic and political circumstances
have changed dramatically at times in some countries, and sometimes tax systems have
changed with them, though not always as one might expect.
These complexities are well illustrated in Mexico’s case. Martinez-Vazquez (2001) notes
that one of the most striking features of the various major tax changes that have taken place
over the decades has been how very little apparent effect they have had on Mexico’s tax-GDP
ratio, which has remained almost constant: it was 10.2% in 1980 and 10.1% in 2004, for
example. That study suggested several possible explanations for this constancy. The reforms
in tax structure (1) may have been undermined by unrelated ad hoc measures, or (2) they
may have been offset by administrative deterioration, or (3) one or both of the preceding may
have occurred less by accident than by intention. Similar relative constancy can be seen in
other countries (e.g., Colombia) over the decades despite repeated tax reforms (McLure and
Zodrow 1997). Such evidence perhaps suggests that a ‘good’ tax reform – one intended to
raise more revenue in a more efficient and equitable fashion, for instance – may be something
4

Cetranglo and Gomez-Sabaini (2006) show that the simple average of central taxes (excluding social security)
fell from 11.0% of GDP in 1980 to 10.3% in 1990 and then rose slowly to 12.7% in 2000.
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like a ‘good’ seat belt law. That is, if everything else stayed the same, lives would be saved
(the tax ratio would increase), but things do not stay the same – some people drive faster
when they are belted in, so death rates (tax ratios) show little change. In short, ‘reform’ in
countries that have achieved an equilibrium position with respect to the size and nature of
their fiscal systems may, in the absence of a change in the underlying balance of political
forces and institutions mean not ‘change’ but ‘stability with respect to fiscal outcomes’.
The question remains, why so little change? Two alternative explanations are possible.
Either, somewhat improbably, ‘supply’ (‘capacity’) factors have altered over the period in
such a way as to offset all attempts to raise tax ratios. Or, perhaps more plausibly, ideas as
to what the ‘proper’ tax level should be have altered over time. In Latin America, no real
consensus on the ‘right balance’ appears yet to have been achieved in most countries.
Different developed countries have clearly reached different equilibrium positions,
demonstrating the continued viability of the so-called ‘welfare state’ model in most European
countries and the equally viable but different lower-tax equilibrium in the U.S. and a few
other countries (Lindert 2003). As Messere, de Kam, and Heady (2003) show, there has
been essentially no convergence in either tax levels or structures among OECD countries
in recent decades. They argue there is little reason to expect such convergence in the near
future. Equally, there is no reason to expect any one balance to be right for all developing
countries, in Latin America or elsewhere. As always with public policy, no one size fits all.
What is right, or at least feasible, in Chile or Brazil, for example, is likely to continue to
differ from what may be sustainable in Colombia or Honduras. What matters is not only how
high taxes are (revenue adequacy), but also how the tax level has been chosen, how the taxes
are imposed, and how the funds thus raised are used. Taxation matters are, in democratic
states, resolved through political channels. Indeed, history suggests that the need to secure
an adequate degree of consensus from the taxed is one of the principal ways in which, over
the centuries, democratic institutions have spread. Indeed, in this age of information and
mobility no non-dictatorial government can long stay in power without securing a certain
degree of consent from the populace, not least in the area of taxation. State legitimacy thus
rests to a considerable extent on citizens’ ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ (Levi 1988) with
respect to taxation. To secure such compliance, tax systems must, over time, in some sense
represent the basic values of at least a minimum supporting coalition of the population.
Thus, the key aim of the paper is to explain whether better institutions lead to a higher
tax effort. The first hypothesis focuses on voice and accountability while the second one will
explore the impact of corruption.
Hypothesis 1: A more encompassing and legitimate state is an essential precondition for a
more adequate tax system. If taxpayers perceive that their interests (preferences)
are properly represented in political institutions having a meaningful ‘voice’ in
influencing the state their willingness to contribute increases.
The best that can be done to help the relevant decision-makers make the right decision is
to ensure that they and all those affected are made as aware as possible of all the relevant
consequences. For a country to implement a better tax system – better in the sense of giving
the people what they want – it must have a better political system that transmutes citizen
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preferences into policy decisions as efficiently as possible. ‘Democracy’, as Churchill reportedly
once said, ‘is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time’.5
Recent broader historical and comparative analysis broadly supports this argument.6
Lindert (2002), for example, suggests that democratic polities do learn from experience, and
do, over time, tend to reward more those parties that follow more prudent economic policies.
Cheibub (1998) demonstrates that even new democracies have frequently raised taxes. Those
who think that populists who promise immediate delivery of the moon to the voters will
invariably win should, it seems, consider more carefully the meaning of Abraham Lincoln’s
famous dictum to the effect that one can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the
people all of the time, but that one can never fool all of the people all of the time. Economic
history appears to tell us that, at least in societies with the error-correction mechanism that
we call ‘democracy’, Lincoln was right, at least to some extent. As Blyth (2002, p. 274) puts
essentially the same point:
‘Political economies …are …evolutionary systems populated by agents who learn and
apply those lessons in daily practice.’
Some years ago, Michael Best (1976) analyzed Central American tax policy in essentially a
‘class’ framework, arguing that in principle changes in tax level structure (e.g., the degree of
emphasis on income taxation) reflected largely the changing political balance of power between
landlords, capitalists, workers, and peasants. Shortly after his article appeared, the Sandinista
government – perhaps the most explicitly leftist regime ever to have power in the region (apart
from Cuba) – took over in Nicaragua. What happened to taxes? First, as Best (1976) would have
predicted, the tax ratio rose very quickly, from 18 to 32 percent of GDP within the first five
years of the Sandinista regime. Secondly, however, almost all the increased tax revenue came
from regressive indirect taxes, not the progressive income taxes that one might have expected.
Third, and in many ways most interesting, once Nicaragua’s tax ratio was increased, it stayed up
there even a decade (and three subsequent governments) after the defeat of the Sandinistas.7
Latin America and indeed much of the developing world has yet to experience even the
earlier parts of the cycle that produced the (more or less) redistributive and (more or less)
growth-facilitating fiscal states now found in developed countries – the long preparatory period
5

6

7

As Lindert (2004) shows, this quotation actually had a somewhat different implication in its original context,
but it is nonetheless largely right if one is concerned with growth: as Lindert (2004, p. 344), concludes, history
tells us that ‘the average democracy has been better for economic growth than the average autocracy…’.
See Bird (2003) and Bräutigam et al. (forthcoming) for extended discussions. One might perhaps question
the relevance of historical or even comparative experience in analyzing and understanding the problems of
developing countries today. As a recent book notes, however, ‘Today’s industrialized countries were yesterday’s
developing or transitional economies and for tax policy purposes the demarcation line between them is more
likely to be the relative efficiency and integrity of the tax administration, rather than such economic criteria as
GDP per capita’ (Messere, de Kam, and Heady 2003, preface). Of course, how a tax administration functions
is itself largely determined by more fundamental political factors.
Peacock and Wiseman (1967) many years earlier had explained a similar discrete jump in tax effort and
public expenditure in Great Britain as a ´displacement effect´: general perceptions about what is a tolerable
level of taxation tend to be quite stable until these perceptions get shocked by social upheavals, and levels
of taxation that would have been previously intolerable become acceptable and remain at that level after the
social perturbations have disappeared.
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during which the idea of the desirability, and even necessity, of a larger fiscal system becomes
established. Instead, bypassing as it were this ‘egalitarian’ period, some countries in Latin
America seem to have moved directly from the feudal inequality of land-based maldistribution
to the modern era of capital-based maldistribution. As Lledo, Schneider, and Moore (2003,
p. 47) stress, much of the problem in Latin America is that most countries lack
‘…an (implicit) social contract between governments and the general populace of the
kind that is embedded in taxation and ﬁscal principles and practices in politically more
stable parts of the world’.
What do such arguments suggest with respect to increasing tax effort in Latin America or
in developing countries more generally? Weisman (2002, p. 366) concludes with respect to
the United States that
‘…the search for the right balance is an endless process…. The consensus supporting the
legitimacy of the income tax is likely to remain undisturbed. But its progressive nature
will always be debated as long as we care about reconciling the competing demands of
social equity, economic incentives and the need to pay for an expanding government’.
In Latin America, no real consensus on the ‘right balance’ appears yet to have been achieved
in most countries. The fact that a few developed countries may have, as it were, moved on to
a new, less progressive consensus does not mean that it has become any less important for
Latin America to develop its own viable democratic social consensus on the right balance
between equity and efficiency in taxation.
The real question is why so little has been done. From this perspective, by far the most
important conclusion of Lledo, Schneider, and Moore (2003) – which is also in many ways
the main point of the present section – is their final recommendation ‘to improve political
institutions in ways that enhance legitimacy and capacity.’ In other words, there can, so to
speak, be no good taxation without good representation. Frey and Eichenberger (1999, p. 89)
argue that many developing countries have both ‘over-government’ and ‘under-government’,
that is, a strong combination of interventionism and bureaucracy with property rights that are
not sufficiently secured and where there is a high degree of uncertainty. In such an environment
there are weak incentives for investment and entry in the formal sector. Corruption is high
and bureaucrats have an incentive to delay transactions in order to extract higher payments.
But, a main problem with rent creation through regulation is that it
‘...is often inefﬁcient, in part because the policies they pursue to increase the rents from
corruption are distortionary’ (Djankov et al. 2002, p. 3).
There are situations in many developing countries where if people want to open a business,
to acquire land or build homes they are confronted with very high transaction costs, and lawbreaking may be the only option to survive. Hernando de Soto (2000) tested the seriousness
of barriers to entry by creating a new and perfectly legal small business in Lima. His team
spent six hours a day at it and was able to register the business 289 days later. The cost of the
legal registration was $1,231, or thirty-one times the monthly minimum wage. To obtain the
authorization to build a house on state-owned land took six years and 11 months, with 207
administrative steps in 52 government offices and to obtain legal title to that piece of land
60
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took 728 steps.8 Similar experiences have been described in other countries, e.g., Philippines,
Egypt, and Haiti.9 A state in which corruption is rampant is one in which citizens have little
trust in authority and thus a low incentive to cooperate. De Soto (1989) reports that 10 times
they were asked for a bribe to speed up the process and that twice paying the bribe was the only
possible way to continue the experiment. It took 10 months in total to start the business.
Hypothesis 2:

In order to explain international differences in tax ratios we also need to take
into account demand factors such as governance and the level of corruption. If
taxpayers believe that they live in a state in which corruption is rampant and
trust in authority low, the willingness to vote for higher levels of taxation and
comply with their tax obligations will decrease.

In sum, a contribution of this paper is thus to extend the basic tax effort model by establishing
the extent to which voice, accountability and good governance matter. We argue that how
much any society collects in taxes to a considerable extent reflects what we called its ‘political
equilibrium’ and that its level of tax effort was not likely to change drastically unless the
underlying forces determining that equilibrium level also changed. In the next section we
probe more deeply into the conditions under which tax effort can be increased by examining
empirically the determinants of tax effort across a broad sample of developing and transition
countries. We take into account not only ‘supply factors’ (tax handles) but also critical ‘demand
factors’ affecting institutional quality like voice and corruption.

III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOCUSING ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
To test whether government quality fosters tax efforts, we propose the following baseline
equation:
TEi= α + β1 Yi +β2 POPi +β3 XMi+ β4 NAGRi+ β5 GOVQi+REGIONi + εi

(1)

where i indexes the countries in the sample, TEi denotes the country’s level of tax effort
measured as the tax revenue as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), Yi the GDP per
capita (measured in $US), POPi the rate of population growth, XMi the ratio of exports plus
imports to GDP, NAGRi the non agriculture share of GDP and GOVQi are our indicators for
voice/accountability and corruption. REGIONi is a dummy variable that differentiates between
Latin American and other developing or transition countries. εi denotes the error term. The
model is estimated using cross-section data with mean values for the years 1990 to 1999. Data
for the dependent variable and all the control variables comes from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) for 2003.
8

9

Furthermore, de Soto argues that it is nearly as difficult to stay legal, as it is to become legal. In Venezuela,
the share of employees working in legal enterprises decreased from two thirds in 1976 to less than half at the
end of the century as people have created new business illegally to fill the gaps in the legal economy. On the
persistence and even growth of informality in many countries, see Chen (2005).
For a recent study of these and other costs of doing business in different countries (see World Bank, 2006).
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We begin our empirical part by re-examining the role of the traditional supply side variables
of the tax effort literature. The explanatory variables employed in the model follow those used
in the conventional tax effort literature. Per capita GDP is a proxy for the level of development
of a country. A higher level of development goes together with a higher capacity to pay and
collect taxes, as well as a higher relative demand for income elastic public goods and services
(Chelliah 1971, Bahl 1971). In general, we would expect a positive relation between the level
of per capita income and the level of tax effort.
Demographic characteristics may also be an important determinant of tax effort. As Bahl
(2003, p. 13) points out, in countries with faster growing populations tax systems may lag
behind in the ability to capture new taxpayers. This suggests that the rate of population growth
is negatively related to the level of tax effort.
The most traditional explanatory variables in the conventional tax effort literature are
those controlling for a country’s economic structure. These variables reflect the idea that the
availability of ’tax handles’ should influence the level of tax effort. For example, trade taxes
are often a major source of government revenues in less developed countries because they are
easier to collect than income taxes. We measure the availability of this tax handle by openness,
defined as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. The tax ratio is expected to be
positively related to the degree of openness of the economy.
The sectoral composition of domestic product may also affect the ability to tax. A traditional
measure signaling the difficulty to tax domestic output is the share of agriculture in GDP. Some
argue that the agricultural sector is not much more difficult to tax (Bahl 2003), but the larger
its relative importance in a country’s economy the lower the need to spend on governmental
activities and services, as many public sector activities are city-based (Tanzi 1992). In addition,
for political reasons some countries exempt from taxes a large share of agricultural activities.
A higher non-agriculture share in GDP should thus produce a higher tax ratio.
Equation 1 in Table 1 contains our results for the conventional model. We observe the
tendency that estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables are in line with predictions
and largely coincide with previous findings in the literature. A faster rate of population growth
leads to a lower tax ratio. A higher share of non-agricultural sector is correlated with a higher
tax effort. The coefficient for GDP per capita does not have the predicted sign, but the results
are in line with previous studies.10 However, openness of the economy is not associated in our
results with a higher tax effort.11 Interestingly, we observe that Latin American countries have
a statistically significant lower tax ratio than other developing and transition countries. This
finding gives empirical support to the arguments developed in the previous section regarding
the unsuccessful outcomes in Latin America.
In a next step we extend in equation 2 to 4 the traditional basic tax effort model that has
ignored the role of demand factors in explaining relative revenue performance. We use the
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) data set to measure voice and accountability and
10

11
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We explored the possibility of a non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and tax effort by adding
the square of GDP per capita to the equation. However, the coefficient for the new term was generally not
significant.
As many countries have proceeded over the past several decades to lower tariff rates as part of their liberalization
and economic reforms policies and joining the WTO, the strong link in the past between international trade
and revenue collections may have weakened in more recent times.
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corruption. All scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better
institutions (outcomes). The variable voice and accountability index includes in it a number of
indicators that measure various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights.
The variable measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the
selection of governments. The index also includes three indicators that measure the independence
of the media as a proxy of monitoring the authority and holding them accountable for their
actions. The variable corruption measures perceptions of corruption using the conventional
definition of corruption namely the exercise of public power for private gain. The index is
developed from various sources covering different aspects that range from the frequency of
‘additional payments to get things done’ to the effects of corruption on the business environment
(Kaufmann et al. 2003, p. 8). Kaufmann et al. (2003) stress that
‘presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter
(typically a private citizen) and the corrupted (typically a public ofﬁcial) for the rules
which govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance according
to our deﬁnition’ (p. 8).
Because of the high correlation (0.57) between Corruption and the voice and accountability
variable, we use these two sets of indexes in alternate estimations in equation 2 and 3. In equation
4 we include both variables in the same specification. The relative role played by demand
factors vis-à-vis supply factors is investigated by estimating beta or standardized regression
coefficients. The results in Table 1 show that the demand side determinants are highly relevant
in explaining tax performance in transition and developing countries. The two variables are
always statistically significant showing relatively high beta coefficients, comparable or even
higher than the traditional supply factors. Thus, these empirical results suggest strongly that
corruption and voice and accountability play a significant role in the determination of the level
of tax effort of developing and transition countries. The joint role played by these demand factors
can be investigated using a Wald-test for coefficient restrictions to test for joint significance.
Equation 4 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that these demand factors play
a significant role in the determination of countries’ tax performance. Though the conventional
supply factors continue to play a robust and significant role throughout the estimations, demand
factors clearly matter. These results give support to the hypothesis that societies’ willingness
to tax themselves depends on the perception that government institutions are honest and
responsive and that there is a fair and predictable public sector environment. One last general
result in Table 1 is that Latin American countries show consistently lower tax performance
compared to other developing and transition countries. This again provides statistical support
for the arguments developed in the previous section of this paper that explained why Latin
America countries have difficulties to improve their tax efforts.
An obvious problem with the approach above is that our two demand variables may
be endogenous. For example, better institutions may lead to better tax performance, but in
turn, poor tax performance can reduce the possibilities of establishing or maintaining well
functioning institutions in developing and transition countries. To investigate any potential
endogeneity problem, in Table 2 we report two 2SLS estimations together with several diagnostic
tests and the first stage regressions. Table 2 indicates that for the 2SLS, the coefficients of
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corruption and the voice and accountability remain statistically significant. The choice of
adequate instruments for institutions is not extensively addressed in the literature. However,
studies such as those by Alesina et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1999) suggest factors such
as ethnic, language and religion fractionalization or legal origin. Both studies state that that
fractionalization leads to political instability, poor quality of institutions, badly designed
economic policy and disappointing economic performance. As an instrument we take an index
that covers ethnic, language and religion fractionalization (mean value) based on the Alesina et
al. (2003) data set. As a second instrument we consider the legal origin of a country (dummy
English common law origin) using the La Porta et al. (1999) data set. The idea behind using
the legal origin as instrument is the fact that the legal system was acquired centuries ago as a
part of the political system. La Porta et al. (1999) stress that the English common law started
to develop in the 17th century due to the intention of limiting the power of the sovereign/state
and therefore also the possibilities of corruption, emphasizing, for example, strongly aspects
such as property rights.
Table 2 shows that these instruments are effective in explaining our demand factors.
The first stage regressions indicate the instruments are mostly statistically significant at the
5 or 1% level. The F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression is
statistically significant in the first case at the 1% level. In addition, Table 2 also reports a test
for instrument relevance using the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for whether the
equation is identified. The test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected indicating that
the model is identified and the instruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubin test suggests
that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. Such a test is robust to the
presence of weak instruments. We also present the Sargan test for over-identification for the
first four 2SLS to examine the validity of the exclusion restrictions. The test results indicate
that the Sargan tests fail to reject the null hypotheses that our instruments are valid.

IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOCUSING ON
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES
In the next step we explore whether we also observe a robust relationship between governance
quality and tax effort in high income countries using the World Bank deﬁnition (see http://www.
worldbank.org/); the countries are listed in the Appendix. We are going to work with two
time periods to maximize the number of observations, namely 1998 and 2000 (unbalanced
panel).
The results are reported in Table 3. Also here we observe that the demand side determinants
are highly relevant in explaining tax performance in high income countries. Both variables,
control of corruption and voice and accountability are statistically significant in the first two
regressions showing high beta coefficients and the Wald-test reports that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected. Interestingly, voice and accountability has a stronger impact on tax
performance than corruption. This is also visible in the last regression when both factors are
included together in the specification. These results support previous findings that indicate
the strong role of voice and accountability in high income countries. For example, Torgler and
Schneider (2007) find with Swiss data that tax evasion and the shadow economy is lower in
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cantons with a higher degree of direct political control. Torgler (2005) shows that a higher level
of direct democracy in a jurisdiction leads to an increased willingness to pay taxes. Feld and
Frey (2002) also observe that differences in the treatment of taxpayers by the tax authority are
key, based on their empirical results using also data from Switzerland. Furthermore, Alm and
Torgler (2006) analyse tax morale in the United States and in Europe. They find that countries
with a higher level of democracy have a higher willingness to pay taxes.
In sum, our findings indicate that governance factors clearly matter. These results give support
to the hypothesis that societies’ willingness to tax themselves depends on good government
institutions. These results hold for developing as well as developed countries.

V. CONCLUSION
The fundamental conclusion of this paper is that a more legitimate and responsive state is
likely an essential precondition for a more adequate level of tax effort in developing countries
and also high income countries.
These results have a particular strong policy implication for developing countries. While
at first glance giving such advice to poor countries seeking to increase their tax ratios may not
seem more helpful than telling them to find oil, it is presumably more feasible for people to
improve their governing institutions than to rearrange nature’s bounty. Furthermore, improving
institutions such as enhancing voice or accountability and reducing corruption may not take
longer nor be necessarily more difficult than changing the opportunities for tax handles and
economic structure, such as the relative share of the non-agriculture sector in the economy or
the weight of imports and exports in GDP.
Moreover, the results also indicate that high income countries can also improve their tax
performance through improving their governance structure. In particular, an improvement in
voice and accountability will lead to a higher tax effort.
The most important contribution of this paper has been to extend the conventional model
of tax effort by showing that not only do supply factors matter, but that demand factors
common to all countries also matter quite significantly in the determination of tax effort. Of
course, in order to fully understand the performance of any one country one needs to pay
close attention to the factors that are particular to that country. To return to where we began,
in Kaldor’s terms, countries have indeed ‘learned to tax’…to the extent that their institutions
lead them to do so.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Variable Descriptions and Sources
Variables

Description

REVENUE EFFORT

current revenues/GDP (excluding
grants, average 1990-1999)

WDI (2003)

average 1990-1999

WDI (2003)

TAX EFFORT

GDP PER CAPITA

POPULATION GROWTH

(EXPORT + IMPORT)/GDP
1-AGRICULTURE/GDP
CORRUPTION
VOICE
ENGLISH
FRACTIONALIZATION
INDEX

Source

tax revenue as a share of GDP
(average 1990-1999)

WDI (2003)

average 1990-1999

WDI (2003)

average 1990-1999

WDI (2003)

average 1990-1999

WDI (2003)

covers the mean value of six
governance dimensions (periods
1996, 1998 and 2000)

Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2003)

dummy English common law
origin

La Porta et al. (1999)

covers the mean value of six
governance dimensions (periods
1996, 1998 and 2000)

Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2003)

ethnic, language and religion
fractionalization (mean)

Alesina et al. (2003)

Table A2: High Income Countries
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
ESTONIA
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
ICELAND
ITALY

KUWAIT
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
SLOVENIA
SOUTH KOREA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
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